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 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the 
Tenacity of the Sexual Family Form1  
 
Julie McCandless* and Sally Sheldon** 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (‘the 2008 Act’) has recently passed onto the 
statute books, introducing a range of changes to the 1990 Act of the same name (‘the 1990 
Act’).2  Unsurprisingly, given the controversial nature of its subject matter, the passage of the 
2008 Act attracted sustained critical scrutiny, though this tended often to focus on a relatively 
narrow selection of the range of issues with which it dealt including, notably, the creation of 
animal-human hybrid embryos,
3
 the screening of embryos in order to select a so-called ‘saviour 
sibling’,4 and the removal of the requirement that clinicians consider the future child’s ‘need for 
a father’ when deciding whether a given woman should be accepted for treatment services.5   
 
In this paper, we are concerned with those provisions of the 2008 Act that determine the 
parenthood of children conceived by technologies regulated by the legislation.  The changes 
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1
  We are grateful to the SLSA for funding expenses relating to the interview component of this research and to our 
interviewees (of whom a list appears below in nn 30-35) for sharing their insights into the reform process with us.  
We also thank Emily Jackson, Marie-Andrée Jacob, Daniel Monk and two anonymous referees for helpful 
comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
 
2
 The Act received royal assent on 6 November 2008 and is being phased into operation.  The revised parenthood 
provisions, contained in Part 2 of the Act, were the first changes to come into force and apply to all treatment 
received on or after 6 April 2009.  Other amendments to the 1990 legislation followed in October 2009, with the 
exception of the new parental orders (regarding parenthood resulting from surrogacy) which do not come into force 
until April 2010.  See http://www.hfea.gov.uk/en/1752.html. 
 
3
 These are embryos which combine both human and non-human DNA.  The 2008 Act adopted the term ‘human 
admixed embryos.’  See s 4A 1990 Act, as amended. 
 
4
 See Sched 2, s 1ZA(1)(d) 1990 Act, as amended.  This process involves screening embryos to select an embryo to 
grow into a child who would be a genetically compatible tissue donor for an existing sick child.  
 
5
 See s 13(5) 1990 Act, as amended.  The phrase was replaced with a new requirement that clinicians consider the 
future child’s need for ‘supportive parenting’ in the context of a general welfare assessment. 
 
2 
 
introduced to these ‘status provisions’ are at least equally radical to the deletion of the ‘need for 
a father’ provision (most significantly, in providing for the first time that two women may be 
recognised as a child’s legal parents from the moment of birth) and are likely to make more 
difference in practice.  However, reform of the status provisions received significantly less 
attention from respondents in the public consultation exercises and the two Parliamentary 
committees which considered the reform, from Parliament itself during debate of the Bill, and 
from the media.  Indeed, it would seem that the popular press only became aware of the 
implications of the new status provisions some months after they had been passed.
6
 
 
The lack of attention provoked by the status provisions might lie in their complexity: one 
commentator described them as ‘14 pages of legal jargon’.7  Their reform lacks the apparent 
simplicity and consequent galvanising, polarising appeal of the question of whether 
consideration of a future child’s ‘need for a father’ should simply be deleted.   Yet, whilst 
technically complex, revising the status provisions raises equally charged questions regarding 
what a family should ‘look like’.  The questions faced by drafters included not merely whether 
law should recognise two women as a child’s parents but, if so, on what basis and what 
terminology might best be adopted for two parents of the same sex.  Further, how might we best 
recognise a child’s social parents (those who will raise him or her) alongside those who 
contributed genetic material to his or her creation?  Here, the architects of the 2008 Act 
confronted the possibilities offered not just by the donation of sperm, egg and embryo, but also 
of mitochondrial DNA, offering the possibility of three ‘parents’ with a genetic link to the child.8  
In this paper, our aim is to explain both what is innovative about the provisions which they 
crafted, but also to elucidate the extent to which, far from offering ‘a radical and dangerous new 
departure in family law’,9 or a ‘lego-kit model of family life’,10 these provisions equally reflect 
deep rooted assumptions and highly conservative understandings about who should count as 
family.  
 
In tracing some of the normative underpinnings of the new law, we adopt the conceptual tool of 
the ‘sexual family’ offered by Martha Fineman.  Fineman bemoaned the grip of the ‘sexual 
family’ on the US legal imagination, coining this term as a useful shorthand to describe the ideal 
family type of a heterosexual couple, joined through a formally celebrated union, living with 
                                                 
6
 For example, the Daily Mail reported the parenthood provisions as ‘news’ in March 2009:  F. MacRae, ‘Another 
blow to fatherhood: IVF mothers can name ANYONE as ‘father’ on birth certificate – and it doesn’t even have to be 
a man’ Daily Mail (2 March 2009).  See further below at nn 153-157. 
 
7
 R. Smith, ‘Single Women Can Name “almost anyone” as Second Parent after IVF’ Daily Telegraph (2 March 
2009). 
 
8
 The legislature needed also to consider the future possible reproductive use of artificial gametes (derived from 
adult stem cells).  This was prohibited under the 2008 Act, which amended s 3 of the 1990 Act to provide that only 
‘permitted’ embryos and gametes can be put to reproductive use.  Artificial gametes do not fall within the relevant 
definition provided in s 3ZA of the 1990 Act, as amended. 
 
9
 Per Christian Institute, House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos 
(Draft) Bill, Vol II Evidence, Session 2006-07, HL Paper 169-II, HC Paper 630-II (July 2007), Ev 61, para 13. 
 
10
 Per Family Education Trust, ibid, Ev 69, question 16(a). 
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genetically related offspring.
11
  According to Fineman, such an understanding of the family has 
been at the centre of the development of family law and policy, being assumed both as the reality 
for which legislation should be made and the ideal norm, which it should strive to enforce.  This, 
she argues, has resulted in legislation that is more concerned with family form than the actual 
contingencies of care-taking relationships and dependency.  In this paper, we take the concept of 
the ‘sexual family’ as a useful framework for seeking to understand the changes introduced by 
the 2008 Act.  We describe what, in these reforms might seem disruptive of the unity of the 
sexual family, yet we aim also to trace the tenacious hold of this model on English law in the 
face of developments which might appear at first sight to herald its decline.  As such, we also 
aim to track how the legal sexual family concept is adapting and, perhaps, buckling in the light 
of this changing context.  First, however, we provide a little background regarding the process by 
which the 1990 Act came to be amended. 
 
THE REFORM PROCESS 
The 1990 Act established a regulatory regime, overseen by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (‘the HFEA’), for embryo research and for those infertility treatment 
services which involve the creation of embryos outside a woman’s body or the use of any gametes 
other than her own and those of her partner, as well as the storage (and post-storage use of) 
gametes.
12
  The 1990 Act had its origins in a report produced by a Committee of Inquiry, chaired by 
Mary (now Baroness) Warnock in 1984.
13
  Some twenty years on, the Government felt that it was 
time to reconsider the operation of the legislation:  
The [1990] Act has stood the test of time well, and is a tribute to the foresight of its creators ... The Act and the 
regulatory system it established have instilled public confidence in the safe and ethical use of assisted 
reproduction technology subject to appropriate safeguards.  However, it was never expected that the Act would 
remain forever unchanged in this area of fast-moving science.
14
  
Reform was thus thought necessary to update the legislation in the light of advancing scientific 
knowledge and to attempt to ‘future proof’ it against developments yet to come.15  It would also 
provide an opportunity to consolidate various changes made to the legislation since its inception and 
to address certain further lacunae or problems which had become evident with the existing wording 
of the 1990 Act.
16
   Significantly for our purposes, the 2008 Act would also provide an opportunity 
to update the legislation in the light of changing social and familial norms, most notably with 
                                                 
11
 M. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and other Twentieth Century Tragedies (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1995) at 143. 
 
12
 ss 3, 4. 
 
13
 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, Report Cm 9314 (1984). 
 
14
 Department of Health, Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: A Public Consultation (2005). 
 
15
 e.g. the consideration given to artificial gametes.  See above n 8. 
 
16
 Most notably, for our purposes, the ambiguity of the phrase ‘treatment together’ in establishing legal fatherhood 
under s 28(3) 1990 Act.  See further below. 
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respect to the recognition of same sex parents, who were felt by many to be discriminated against by 
the operation of the 1990 Act.   
The first major step in concretising ideas for reform was undertaken in the House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee’s Report on Human Reproductive Technologies and the 
Law in 2005,
17
 which drew on the responses to an on-line public consultation exercise and 
evidence provided by a range of expert witnesses.
18
  While this Committee undertook a wide-
ranging review of the operation of the 1990 Act, it declined to consider the working of the status 
provisions.
19
  This Report was followed by the Department of Health’s own review of the 
legislation in the same year,
20
 which drew on a further public consultation, followed by a white 
paper setting out proposals for reform.
21
   The Department of Health then published draft 
legislation,
22
 which was scrutinised by a Joint Committee of the House of Commons and House 
of Lords, chaired by the Liberal Democrat MP, Phil Willis.
23
  The Joint Committee conducted its 
own on-line consultation exercise on a number of specific questions (none of which concerned 
parenthood),
24
 as well as inviting both written and oral evidence on a broader range of issues.
25
  
The Joint Committee’s work did include brief consideration of the status provisions but it made 
no recommendations regarding them.
26
  Revised legislation, incorporating many of the Joint 
                                                 
17
 House of Commons Science & Technology Committee, Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law (Fifth 
Report of Session 2004-5. HC 7-1) (2005).  See further: HM Government, Government Response to the Report from 
the HC Science & Technology Committee (2005). 
 
18
 Hansard Society, Online Consultation on Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, Commissioned by the 
Science & Technology Select Committee (Summary Report) (2004). 
 
19
 The Committee did consider issues relating to artificial gametes (see paras 89-90) and the welfare clause (paras 
91-101), concluding that the ‘need for a father’ was discriminatory and unjustifiably offensive to many (para 101). 
 
20
 Department of Health, Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: a Public Consultation (2005). 
 
21
 Department of Health, Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: Proposals for Revised 
Legislation, Report Cm 6989 (2006). 
 
22
 Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill 2007.  Following the dropping of provisions foreseeing the merging of 
the HFEA and Human Tissue Authority, the title of the Bill was changed to the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Bill.  For reasons of clarity, we refer to the Bill by this name throughout. 
 
23
 House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, Vol 1: 
Report, Session 2006-07, HL Paper 169-I, HC Paper 630-I (July 2007) (hereafter ‘JC Vol 1’) and Vol II: Evidence, 
Session 2006-07, HL Paper 169-II, HC Paper 630-II (July 2007) (hereafter ‘JC Vol 2’); see also HM Government, 
Government Response to the Report from the Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, 
Report Cm 7209 (2007). 
 
24
 For details, see JC Vol 1, pp 105-10.   
 
25
  See JC Vol 2. 
 
26
 Though it did recommend that further consideration be given to whether the fact of donation be registered on a 
birth certificate (JC Vol 1, para 276) and further changes be made to the draft welfare clause (para 243). 
 
5 
 
Committee’s recommendations, was then subject to over eighty hours of parliamentary debate.27  
While the revision of the welfare clause did occupy a significant proportion of this time, again, 
the status provisions passed virtually undiscussed.
28
 
In this paper, we draw on the extensive published documentation produced at all stages of the 
process described above.  While we are interested in the content of these discussions, our focus 
on the status provisions means that we are inevitably also interested in what was ignored or not 
considered in any detail within them, being deemed a low priority or simply taken for granted as 
entirely uncontroversial.  In order better to address these questions, we rely on a further key 
source: a small number of semi-structured, in-depth interviews with key actors who were 
involved in shaping the legislation.
29
  Our interviewees included key officials at the Department 
of Health with responsibility for overseeing the drafting and implementation of the relevant 
aspects of the legislation,
30
 a senior member of the HFEA,
31
 the academic legal advisors to the 
two parliamentary committees mentioned above,
32
 the Chair of the Joint Committee,
33
 and a 
further member of that Committee, who is also a member of the House of Lords and herself a 
former Chair of the HFEA.
34
  We also draw on a number of communications with the General 
                                                 
27
 For the text of the Bill, amendments tabled and links to all parliamentary debates, see:  
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2007-08/humanfertilisationandembryology.html. 
 
28
 Totalling up the occasional brief mentions to the status provisions over the course of this eighty hours gives a total 
of around one hour, with about fifteen minutes of this occupied with discussion of the clause that was to become s 
46 of the 2008 Act, dealing with the naming on a birth certificate of a partner who dies prior to the treatment of the 
mother: see HL Debs vol 698 cols 475-9 (28 January 2008).  This does not take account of discussion relating to a 
child’s right to information regarding his/her conception and whether birth certificates should be marked in some 
way to indicate donor conception, which was far more thoroughly discussed.  
 
29
 Key actors were identified by the authors by virtue of the professional role which they had held in the reform 
process, with each interviewee also asked to identify anyone who they felt had played a particularly significant role 
in the reform process.  Interviewees were contacted directly by the authors and all requests for interviews were 
granted with two exceptions: Dawn Primarolo, MP (the Minister responsible for steering the 2008 Act through 
Parliament) and Kenneth Clark, MP (the Minister responsible for steering the 1990 Act through Parliament).  
Interviewees were sent a brief synopsis of the research project in the initial invitation.  Interviewees were also 
offered an indicative list of questions for preparatory purposes, with three interviewees requesting this information 
(McLean, Morgan and Willis, see below nn 32 and 33).  The interviews, ranging from 40-120 minutes, were 
conducted by the authors and transcribed by a professional transcriber.  A copy of the interview schedule is on file 
with the authors. 
 
30
 Edward Webb, Deputy Director for Human Tissue Transplantation, Embryology and Consent; Gwen Skinner, the 
policy manager responsible for the development of the legal parenthood provisions in the 2008 Act; and Katy Berry, 
who was responsible for the implementation of the 2008 Act. 
 
31
  Emily Jackson, Deputy Chair of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. 
 
32 
 Derek Morgan, Advisor to the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee and Sheila McLean, 
Advisor to the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee and the Joint Committee. 
 
33
 Phil Willis, MP. 
 
34
 Baroness Ruth Deech. 
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Register Office.
35
  While the limitations of the information which can be gleaned from such 
interviews should be acknowledged, our interviewees provided numerous insights into the 
reform process that are unavailable from the published documentation.
36
 
The reform process outlined above was lengthy and undoubtedly resulted in rigorous scrutiny of 
certain key aspects of the 2008 Act.  However, there were also some important limitations on 
what was achievable in this process, which should be noted at the outset.  First and most 
significantly, the 2008 Act is an amending statute.  Nowhere was a blank piece of paper offered 
for reform, in a way that allowed for a thorough and fundamental rethinking of the kind of 
regulation which might best suit this area or the ethical principles which should underpin it.  
Rather the architects of reform worked outwards from the provisions already in place, making 
the key question not ‘what model of law do we want?’ but rather ‘what needs to be changed?’ 
Indeed, the Joint Committee described the reform process as ‘tinkering with the existing legal 
provisions rather than going back to first principles and seeking to take an overall view of where 
to go in the next fifteen years’, singling out the approach taken to parenthood as one of two 
specific examples of the inadequacies of approach.
37
  While Phil Willis MP, the Chair of that 
Committee, confirmed his frustration with this method in interview, the fact that only new 
clauses would be subject to parliamentary debate undoubtedly eased the successful passage of 
the Act, making the Government’s work far easier.38  For current purposes, it can be noted that 
while some aspects of the status provisions were completely rewritten, those regulating legal 
motherhood and the attribution of fatherhood to the legal mother’s husband were left almost 
untouched and barely considered.  
Second, as we noted above, the time available for scrutiny of the legislation was heavily 
dominated by a relatively narrow range of issues.  These issues were dictated by a combination 
of factors, including: key individuals’ power to influence the agenda of the parliamentary 
                                                 
35 
 Email correspondence with David Trembath, Births, Deaths and Adoptions Branch at the General Register Office. 
 
36
 In so far as is possible within such a small cohort of interviewees, we attempted to mitigate problems of fading 
memories and selective recall by interviewing more than one person involved in each key stage of the reform 
process (which we take to be the drafting of the legislation overseen by the Department of Health, the pre-legislative 
scrutiny offered by the Joint Committee and discussion of the new statute in Parliament) and by checking the 
information gleaned from the interviews against the available published documentation.  While key actor interviews 
have some well-rehearsed limitations, we have nevertheless obtained a perspective on this reform process that would 
simply not have been possible to glean from the published documentation alone.  For a methodological 
consideration of key actor interviews, see T. Odendahl and A. Shaw, ‘Interviewing Elites’ in J Gubrium and J. 
Holstein (eds), Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002) 299-316. 
 
37
 Along with the approach to the regulation of human admixed embryos.  JC Vol 1, para 44.  
 
38
 Respectively, interviews with Willis and Webb on file.  Webb told us: ‘an option could have been just to repeal 
the 1990 Act altogether and start with a new one that starts at clause one. But that would have required a debate on 
all the various provisions and sections in the 1990 Act, including those where there were no Government proposals 
for change and if everyone is happy, then why volunteer provisions to be reopened?  So that was a conscious 
decision by Ministers to have an Amendment Act.'  And later: ‘We have to be aware there's a job to do, in a certain 
time-scale and we can’t afford to turn over stones that we don’t need to turn over.’  
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committees;
39
 significant media interest in particular aspects of the law; attention from the public 
and expert witnesses in the various consultation exercises;
40
 and the limited amount of available 
time, which resulted in matters deemed less pressing simply falling off the agenda.  The Joint 
Committee Chair told us that he had hoped that many of the issues which had been insufficiently 
discussed in Committee would have received further attention in Parliament but this did not 
happen because of way that debate had been guillotined around the ‘big sexy issues’.41  In terms 
of parenthood under the Act, each of these factors appears heavily to have contributed to the 
focus on the ‘need for a father’ provision and lack of detailed scrutiny of the status provisions, 
noted above. Further, it should be noted that a significant proportion of the time available to the 
Joint Committee for the essential work of detailed pre-legislative scrutiny was taken up with 
exploring (and eventually defeating) the Government’s plan to merge the HFEA with the Human 
Tissue Authority to form a new regulatory body: the Regulatory Authority for Tissues and 
Embryos (‘RATE’).  This proposal emerged as a cost-cutting measure following the Department 
of Health’s review of Arm’s Length Bodies.42  The proposal found favour with virtually no one 
but absorbed an extensive amount of time and energy – not to mention the general resources that 
were expended in the preparations for RATE – from a Committee which was already forced to 
work to a seriously constrained timeframe, thus exacerbating the need to prioritise which aspects 
of reform might be considered.
43
    
A third point to note is that the task of overseeing the redrawing of the legislation fell to a 
Government Department – Health – that does not have central responsibility for law and policy 
relating to the family.  As we will explain below, some radical innovations in family law in other 
countries (most notably the recognition of three legal parents on the birth certificate) are taking 
place in the context of conceptions resulting from the use of assisted reproduction.  In this reform 
process, however, the view was strongly taken that it was not for a Government Department 
concerned with health to instigate significant change in the area of family law and policy.
44
   
Rather, the Department of Health took a deliberately cautious view, eschewing any radical 
innovation in this area, emphasising the importance of legislating for the majority of cases and 
                                                 
39
 In this sense, Sheila McLean, who was the specialist advisor to both parliamentary committees, told us: ‘I got no 
sense that there was any real interest in the parenthood thing at all, to be honest.’  Derek Morgan, advisor to the 
Science and Technology Committee explained it in terms of that Committee being interested in the ‘politics of 
reproductive regulation and not the politics of reproduction.’ Interviews on file. 
 
40
 Willis, interview on file.   
 
41
 Willis, interview on file. 
 
42
 See further Department of Health, Reconfiguring the Department of Health’s Arm’s Length Bodies (2004). 
 
43
 The Joint Committee was given just under nine sitting weeks to consider the draft legislation, rather than the 
recommended 12.  JC Vol 1, paras 2-3.  It is ironic that a measure designed to save time and money could have 
absorbed such extensive resources. 
 
44
  Webb, interview on file. 
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ensuring that provisions were drafted in such a way as to accord with common sense views of the 
family.
45
 
While the 2008 Act introduces a number of changes relevant to parenthood, as noted above our 
focus here is on just the reworking of the ‘status provisions’.46  In what follows, we consider in 
turn the provisions regulating the acquisition of motherhood, fatherhood and female parenthood.  
With regard to each, we briefly outline the working of the 1990 Act before going on to provide a 
detailed exposition of the provisions which were eventually voted onto the statute books. We then 
move on to a close analysis of the enduring legacy of the ‘sexual family’ model in this reform 
process.  Relying on this conceptual framework, we aim to make explicit some of the broad beliefs 
and values which implicitly underpinned the choices made in this process, thus opening them up for 
further ethically and empirically informed evaluation in the future. 
 
 
THE ‘STATUS PROVISIONS’ OF THE 2008 ACT 
 
The ‘status provisions’ of the 1990 and 2008 Acts set out who should be treated as the legal 
parents of a child conceived through regulated treatments in those, relatively rare, cases where 
the child is not straightforwardly the genetic offspring of both parents.
47
   As we aim to show, the 
model of family underlying these provisions was barely considered by the reformers at all, not 
forming a core part of the reform project.  Rather, those involved in the reform project tended to 
rely on common sense assumptions about the family, which were subject to little sustained 
scrutiny or critical evaluation.  
 
                                                 
45
 Skinner described how Department of Health officials worked by testing out the new agreed parenthood 
provisions against their intuitions: ‘We went through a lot of situations where we imagined possible circumstances 
that could arise and tested out the Bill to see if it would meet those.  For example,  thinking through the most 
complex personal relationship changes, which could possibly happen  in a period of six months,  to see if the Bill 
worked ... We thought about all the things that could happen to a couple, maybe other people coming into the 
relationship or a person making a different decision about her sexual orientation and marrying someone when she’s 
got a legal parenthood agreement in place with another woman and seeing if the Bill worked against all possible 
scenarios.  That was the test really.’ Interview on file. 
 
46
 A number of further changes of interest are not discussed here.  Notably, the new law also includes an extension 
of the rights of children conceived via gamete donation to information regarding the circumstances of their 
conception; a relaxing of the eligibility requirements for ‘fast-track’ adoption procedures following surrogacy 
arrangements;  a prohibition on the reproductive use of artificial gametes (derived from adult stem cells); the 
introduction of a ‘cooling off’ period before embryos can be destroyed in the light of a disagreement as to their 
future disposition on the part of the man and woman who contributed the gametes resulting in their creation; and, as 
noted above, it replaces the requirement that clinicians consider a future child’s need for a father with a requirement 
to consider the child’s need for ‘supportive parenting’ in s 13(5).  On the first of these, see further C. Jones, ‘The 
Identification of “Parents” and “Siblings”: New Possibilities Under the Reformed Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act’ in J. Wallbank, S. Choudhry and J. Herring (eds), Rights, Gender and Family Law (London: 
Routledge Cavendish, in press 2009) ch 10. 
 
47
 In the vast majority of treatment services provided in clinics, the future parents’ own gametes will be used.  The 
legislation covers only treatments involving donated gametes (sperm, ova, embryos) and/or the creation of an 
embryo outside of a woman’s body, see n 12 above.  Some licensed treatments are not caught by the status 
provisions, namely insemination procedures whereby the sperm of the woman’s husband or partner is used.   
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In very broad terms, the 2008 Act maintains the 1990 Act’s provisions regarding motherhood, 
rewrites the provisions regarding fatherhood whilst remaining true to their ethos, and introduces 
one particularly significant innovation: if certain conditions are met, the female partner – or, 
indeed, friend or acquaintance – of a mother who conceives through the regulated technologies 
may also now be recognised as the resulting child’s legal parent.  As noted above, the new 
parenthood provisions were the first part of the 2008 Act to come into operation, applying to all 
regulated treatments which take place on or after 6 April 2009.  Here, we first outline the 
changes introduced to legal motherhood and legal fatherhood resulting from the use of regulated 
technologies before going on to look at the female parenthood provisions.   
 
Motherhood 
 
The attribution of the status of mother proved relatively straightforward in both the 1990 and 
2008 Acts: excluding the case of adoption, the birth mother and no other is to be treated as the 
legal mother of the child.
48
  This remains true whether or not the egg used to conceive the 
pregnancy was the woman’s own and regardless of whether a surrogacy agreement was in 
existence.  This gestational grounding of motherhood has meant that, in the UK, a surrogate 
mother’s right to be recognised as a child’s legal mother has never been successfully 
challenged.
49
  It should be noted that not all jurisdictions have followed this approach: most 
famously, the Californian court in Johnson v Calvert took the view that motherhood might be 
grounded in genetic links combined with an intention to create a child.
50
  Yet in the UK reform 
process, at no point was any serious consideration given to the possibility of changing the 
principle that motherhood is singularly grounded in gestation.
51
   
  
However, the 2008 Act does contain one innovation pertaining to motherhood: it gives added 
emphasis to the principle that no route to legal motherhood (or female parenthood),
52
 can be 
achieved purely on the basis of a genetic link, providing that a woman is not to be treated as the 
parent of a child who she has not carried, except where she is so treated on the basis of other 
provisions of the Act.
53
  The section mirrors a similar provision which, in certain circumstances, 
exempts a man from being considered the legal father of a child resulting from his donated 
                                                 
48
 s 27 1990 Act, s 33 2008 Act. 
 
49
 In Re P (a Child) [2007] EWCA Civ 105, on a highly unusual set of facts, the genetic father succeeded in winning 
a residence order but the surrogate’s legal status as the child’s mother remained undisturbed.  For the genetic 
father’s wife to be considered as the child’s legal mother, she will have to adopt the child. 
 
50
  [1993] 5 Cal.4th 84.  The court ruled that when two women can prove they have biological links with a child 
(through ova/gestation), the one who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own 
is the legal mother.  It was considered that this principle would similarly apply to egg donation cases. 
 
51
 There is no discussion of other possibilities in the published documentation listed above, see nn 17-23, and our 
interviews confirmed a lack of such discussion ‘behind the scenes’.   
 
52
 For the acquisition of ‘female parenthood’, see below. 
 
53
 s 47. Notably: civil partnership, agreement with the mother, where provisions regarding the transfer of embryos 
after the death of civil partner/agreed female parent apply, or adoption.  
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sperm.
54
  Yet with regard to men, such a provision is clearly legally necessary: unlike 
motherhood, fatherhood can be – and indeed very frequently is – acquired on the basis of a 
genetic connection.  With regard to women, the section might appear to be legally redundant 
given the very clear provisions setting out that legal motherhood is to be established only 
through gestation (and ‘female parenthood’ only through the provisions detailed below).   As 
such, the decision to include it is of interest, and we discuss it further below. 
 
Fatherhood 
 
Under the 1990 Act, where a child was conceived through the use of donor sperm following 
either licensed treatment or ‘artificial insemination’, the woman’s husband would be the legal 
father unless it could be shown that he did not consent to the relevant treatment.
55
   Despite a 
common assumption to the contrary, the framing of this provision in terms of ‘artificial 
insemination’ served also to catch self-arranged donor insemination, provided that the 
conception was not through sexual intercourse.  Marriage thus commanded a privileged place as 
the preferred way of attributing legal fatherhood.  
 
If no father existed by virtue of marriage, an unmarried man could be deemed the legal father 
where receiving licensed ‘treatment together’ with the mother.56  Unmarried male partners were 
thus able to gain the same parental status as married men, though only where conception resulted 
from licensed treatment services and without the presumption of consent that occurred in 
marriage.
57
  Where someone was treated as a father by virtue of either of these provisions, no 
other man was to be treated as the father of the child.
58
  As mentioned above, where sperm had 
been obtained through a licensed clinic, a sperm donor was not to be treated as the legal father.  
The effect of this, where treatment services were provided for a single woman or a woman in a 
same sex relationship, was that the resulting child would be legally fatherless.  As such, the 1990 
Act extended the severing of a legal connection between genetic paternity and legal fatherhood, 
first to licensed treatments other than donor insemination and, second, to unmarried male 
partners.
59
  It also evidenced a clear intention that a child could and should have only one legal 
father: a married woman who sought treatment services together with a different male partner 
could not succeed in securing two legal fathers for her children. 
 
These provisions have been understood as an attempt to foresee the various ways in which 
people might seek to make use of reproductive technologies and to impose a ‘sexual family’ 
                                                 
54
 s 28(6) 1990 Act; s 41 2008 Act. 
 
55
 s 28(2). In the absence of consent, there is nonetheless a rebuttable presumption that the husband is the father, see 
s 28(5) which explicitly saves the common law marital presumption of paternity.   
 
56
 s 28(3).  
 
57
 Note, however, that the 1990 Act conferred only parental status and not parental responsibility, which is conferred 
through provisions in the Children Act 1989.  
 
58 
s 28(4). 
 
59
 Thus extending the measures introduced by s 27 Family Law Reform Act 1987. 
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template upon the resulting familial relationships.
60
  Yet such foresight inevitably had its limits 
and one important task facing the architects of the 2008 Act was to remove the ambiguity in the 
provision regulating the acquisition of fatherhood by unmarried men, which had been 
highlighted through legal challenges in the years since 1990.
61
 Rejecting the test of ‘treatment 
together’ and the similarly ambiguous notion of ‘joint enterprise’ which the courts had developed 
to give it meaning,
62
 the 2008 Act nevertheless remains true to the spirit of the 1990 legislation.  
It maintains the position that, where a woman seeks treatment with her husband, he will be the 
legal father unless it can be shown that he did not consent to the treatment.
63
  For unmarried 
fathers, it accepts the principle that legal fatherhood should be grounded in the parents’ intention, 
yet rewrites the test to be used to achieve this result, adopting a highly formalised, contractual 
model, which it is hoped, will offer rather more clarity.
64
  Thus, the 2008 Act provides that if 
there is neither a father by virtue of marriage nor a female parent by virtue of civil partnership, 
then an unmarried man can be treated as a child’s father, provided that ‘agreed fatherhood 
conditions’ are met.65  These conditions provide that both the intended mother and father must 
have given written and signed consent to the man being treated as the father of any child 
resulting from the licensed treatment; that at the time of implantation or insemination neither 
party has given notice of withdrawal of this consent; and that the woman has not given further 
notice that she consents to someone else being treated as the father (or female parent) of the 
child.
66
  Significantly, these provisions do not restrict the acquisition of parenthood to a woman’s 
partner, rather they turn on consent (both the mother’s and father’s) in grounding fatherhood.67 
                                                 
60
 J. Dewar, ‘The Normal Chaos of Family Law’ (1998) 61 MLR 467, 482; S. Sheldon ‘Fragmenting Fatherhood: 
the Regulation of Reproductive Technologies’ (2005) 68 MLR 523.  As we noted above, the Department of Health 
described how they would invent various scenarios in which individuals might seek to have children, determine who 
would be considered the legal parents under the (then draft) legislation and test these outcomes against their own 
intuitions as to what was right, n 45 above. 
 
61 
Re B (Parentage) [1996] 2 FLR 15, U v W [1997] 2 FLR 282, Re R (Contact: HFEA) (2001) 1 FLR 247, The 
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v Mr A, Mrs A and Others [2003] EWCA 259 (QBD).  These cases are 
examined in more detail in Sheldon, ibid. 
 
62
 ibid. 
 
63
 s 35.   
 
64
 Webb, interview on file.  Unsurprisingly, this very contractual form of words results from the Department of 
Health’s team of lawyers, who delivered this wording as a means of achieving the outcome desired by the 
Department.   
 
65 
ss 36-37. 
 
66
 Where consent is withdrawn by someone who had previously agreed to be treated as a parent of a child born to a 
woman as a result of treatment services provided to her under the Act, the clinic has a duty to tell the woman of this 
change in circumstances and cannot treat her until she has been so notified: see s 14(6D) of the 1990 Act, as 
amended.  However, where the future mother consents to A being treated as the parent of a child resulting from 
treatment services provided to her (thus extinguishing the claims to parental status of B, who had previously 
consented to be treated as the future child’s father or female parent), the clinic’s duty is merely to take ‘reasonable 
steps’ to notify A of the change in circumstances: s 14(6E), 1990 Act, as amended.    
  
67
 Nonetheless, the most recent edition of the HFEA Code of Practice has retained the language of ‘partner’ to 
describe the prospective second parent.   This raises the questions of the extent to which the impact of the new 
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The provisions do contain one important limitation: the intended parents must not fall within the 
prohibited degrees of relationship foreseen in incest legislation.
68
  We return to this below.   
 
Finally, the 2008 Act incorporates into the 1990 Act the provisions of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act 2003 which allow for a man to be registered 
posthumously as the father of a child.
69
  This status is limited to being named on the birth 
register as the child’s father, and is applicable whether or not the man’s own sperm or donor 
sperm is used in the treatment.
70
  The man must have given written consent for this to happen 
and the mother must consent to his name being recorded on the birth certificate.
71
 
 
Female Parenthood 
 
The most radical change introduced in the reworking of the status provisions is to allow for the 
first time for same sex female partners each to be recognised as the legal parent of a child from 
the moment of birth.
72
  The birth mother would, as previously, be recognised as the legal mother 
by virtue of having gestated the pregnancy.
73
  Under the 2008 Act her partner, or any other 
woman to whom she is not prohibitively related, can also be recognised as a ‘female parent’ on 
lines directly analogous to those by which men may be recognised as fathers.  Thus, where a 
woman is in a registered civil partnership, her partner will be recognised as the child’s ‘female 
parent’ unless it can be shown that she did not consent to the treatment or artificial 
insemination.
74
  Very significantly, as for heterosexual married couples, this provision does not 
apply merely to treatment received in a licensed clinic.  As such, where a civil partnered lesbian 
couple have a child through self-arranged donor insemination, both partners are now legally 
entitled to be registered as parents on a child’s birth certificate and the genetic father will not be 
recognised.  Where a woman is not in a civil partnership, her partner, or another woman, can 
nonetheless be recognised as a ‘female parent’ if treatment is received at a licensed clinic and if 
                                                                                                                                                             
parenthood provisions has been well understood and, further, whether the HFEA’s choice of terminology may prove 
misleading for clinicians.  See HFEA Code of Practice (8
th
 Edition), e.g. at paras 8.3, 8.13.  
 
68
 Marriage Act 1949, First Schedule, as amended by the Marriage Act 1949 (Remedial) Order 2007 (abolishing the 
bar to marriages between former parents and children-in-law).   
 
69
 s 28(5A), 1990 Act, as amended. 
 
70
 ss 39-40 2008 Act, respectively.  Note the separate provisions here for posthumous genetic fatherhood and 
posthumous non-genetic fatherhood. 
 
71
 Such recognition of paternity has no legal force, for example, in terms of nationality or succession.  Rather, this 
measure suggests the symbolic importance of fatherhood in completing the nuclear family. See further Sheldon, n 60 
above. 
 
72 
Same-sex couples have been able to achieve joint parenthood by virtue of adoption since the Adoption and 
Children Act 2002, which came into force in December 2005. 
 
73
 s 33, see above. 
 
74
 s 42. 
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the ‘agreed female parenthood conditions’, which exactly mirror the agreed fatherhood 
conditions, as set out above, are met.
75
 
 
The provisions regarding posthumous registration of fatherhood are likewise extended to female 
parenthood.  While, in the case of men, the legislation contains two separate provisions (one 
regulating cases where the man’s own sperm was to be used, another where it was not), for 
female parenthood only one provision is deemed necessary.
76
  This serves to emphasise the legal 
irrelevance of whether or not a woman is a genetic parent, a point to which we return shortly.  
 
 
THE 2008 ACT AND THE ‘SEXUAL FAMILY’ 
 
As has been noted by earlier commentators, reproductive technologies offer the possibility to 
break down parenthood into the various constituent parts (including social, intentional, genetic 
and gestational links) on which parenthood has typically been predicated and which, in the 
sexual family model, are all located within the sexual couple composed of one mother and one 
father, who raise their own genetic children.
77
  Separating out these different facets of 
parenthood offers difficult challenges for a legal order which has historically laboured hard to 
maintain the fiction that they are united in the sexual family.  Law has policed this fiction in 
various ways, most notably through simply refusing to recognise non-marital children who were 
treated as filius nullius and thus excluded from a place within this symbolic legal order; and 
through rules making it virtually impossible for a married couple to establish that children born 
during a marital union had actually been fathered by a man other than the husband.
78
 
 
However, the coherence of the legal ‘sexual family’ ideal is increasingly out of touch with 
demographic reality.  If such assumptions were ever possible, it is clear that today it cannot be 
presumed that children will be raised by a couple
79
 or, where they are, that the couple will be 
heterosexual
80
 or joined in a formally celebrated union.
81
 Further, many children will not be 
                                                 
75
 ss 43-44. 
 
76
 s 46. 
 
77
 Diduck quite rightly notes that there is nothing natural or inevitable about law’s reliance on these particular 
factors.  Rather, they are elements that law has identified as important in a particular temporal and social context: A. 
Diduck, ‘“If only we can find the appropriate terms to use the issue will be solved”: Law, Identity and Parenthood’ 
(2007) 19 Child and Family Law Quarterly 458.  
 
78
 See generally, Stephen Cretney’s impressive Family Law in the Twentieth Century: A History (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) 533-6 and R. Collier and S. Sheldon, Fragmenting Fatherhood: A Socio-Legal Study 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), ch 6.  See Andrew Bainham’s rather different interpretation on this point: 
Bainham, ‘What is the Point of Birth Registration?’ (2008) 20 Child and Family Law Quarterly 449. 
 
79
 In 2007, 24 per cent of families with dependent children were lone parent families, compared to 7 per cent in 
1972.  See Office of National Statistics (‘ONS’), Social Trends No. 38 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) at 
19. 
 
80
 There have been recent legal reforms that offer to recognise some same sex relationships, through introducing a 
process whereby same-sex partnerships can be formally recognised (Civil Partnership Act 2004) and provisions 
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raised by two parents with whom they share a genetic relationship: a significant increase in the 
rate of non-marital births and decline in marriage as a lifelong permanent commitment to one 
person has resulted in increased numbers of ‘genetic families’ being split across households, with 
children living apart from at least one genetic parent, typically their father.
82
   As such, a great 
many parenting arrangements will not meet all the criteria of the ‘sexual family’ ideal set out 
above.   
 
Beyond these demographic shifts, the use of reproductive technologies drives further clear 
inroads into the sexual family ideal.  The regulatory framework imposed in the 1990 Act strove 
to maintain and entrench the ‘sexual family’ model at a time when other aspects of family law 
had already developed far more flexible and creative ways of recognising the significance which 
multiple ‘parent’ figures might have in a child’s life.83  Yet the cracks in the sexual family model 
were also clearly visible in the 1990 Act (and before), most notably in the acceptance of the 
separation of genetic parenthood from intentional/social parenthood; the formal recognition that 
the sexual couple (and legal parents) at the heart of the family unit need not be the genetic 
parents of any children of the family;
84
 and the attribution of fatherhood to a man neither 
genetically related to the child nor legally connected to the child’s mother.   
 
However, notwithstanding these significant challenges to it, we would suggest that the sexual 
family ideal has retained a significant hold, which is clear in the provisions of the 2008 Act.  
Either because its implicit understanding of the family accorded with their own common sense 
vision of the world or because change was seen as too politically sensitive in this particular 
context, the reformers left undisturbed many of the key assumptions, which had underpinned the 
original 1990 Act.  This can be seen in: the ongoing significance of the formally recognised adult 
couple; law’s continued adherence to a two-parent model; what we describe as ‘parental 
dimorphism’ (which, within the two-parent model, allows only for one mother plus one father or 
female parent); and the notion that the couple must be (at least potentially) in a sexual 
relationship.  We consider each of these factors in more detail below before going on to offer 
some thoughts on transgender parents’ use of reproductive technologies which, we suggest, 
provides a further illustration of various tensions and is set to raise thorny legal problems for 
future judicial determination.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
which allow both parties in a same-sex partnership to have a legally recognised relationship with a child through 
adoption (Adoption and Children Act 2002). 
 
81
 By 2006, 43 per cent of births were to unmarried women compared to a rate of 25 per cent in 1988.  The majority 
of these births are to cohabitees with 86 per cent of non-marital births being jointly registered.  See ONS above n 79 
at 24.  
 
82
 While marriage remains popular (284,000 marriages in 2005), the permanence of the union is less certain, with 
divorce significantly more common (56,000 in 1968, 155,000 in 2005). See ONS ibid, at 20-21. 
 
83
 See e.g. provisions in the Children Act 1989, as amended, relating to parental responsibility and a range of orders 
relating to children, such as those pertaining to contact and residence. 
 
84
 See above.  See further: J. McCandless, ‘Status and Anomaly: Re. D (contact and parental responsibility: lesbian 
mothers and known father) [2006]’ (2008) 30 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 63. 
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The ongoing significance of the formally recognised adult couple 
 
As we have seen, the 2008 Act maintains the hierarchical structure of the 1990 Act, whereby 
husbands (and now female civil partners) are given ‘first shot’ at parental status.85  Only when 
there is no father or female parent by virtue of this formally recognised relationship,
86
 are the 
courts directed to consider whether there is a father or female parent under the agreed parenthood 
provisions.  As such, while marriage may no longer be the only means of legally recognising an 
adult couple, it retains considerable importance and the extension of the marital presumption to 
female civil partners can be seen as assimilation to (and extension of) this marital ideal rather 
than any radically new way of recognising parent-child legal ties.
87
    It is noteworthy, however, 
that a presumption which used to be grounded in a high probability that the husband was the 
genetic father is now extended to situations where we know for certain that there is no genetic 
relationship between parent and child.
88
  
 
We noted above a further significant distinction between formally recognised and other 
partnerships: parental status is presumed for husbands (and now civil partners) in both licensed 
and self-arranged ‘artificial insemination’, whereas unmarried/unregistered partners can gain 
legal recognition under the 2008 Act only in the context of licensed treatment and only where 
they satisfy the agreed parenthood conditions.
89
  While procedures involving IVF techniques can 
only occur in a medical setting, practices such as donor insemination do not necessarily require 
medical assistance.  Although there are no available figures, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the practice of self-arranged artificial insemination is more common amongst lesbian couples 
than heterosexual couples and the effects of extending the presumption of parenthood to civil 
partners who arrange their own artificial insemination are thus highly significant.  This extension 
also poses interesting questions for birth registration procedures in relation to what evidence a 
Registrar might legitimately request in order to establish that the conception was ‘artificial’ 
                                                 
85
 Note that this is also true in the context of surrogacy, where if the birth mother is married or in a civil partnership, 
and the conception is brought about by means other than sexual intercourse, her husband or female partner will be 
the presumed second parent of the child.  This is true even when the gametes of the commissioning father (or indeed 
mother) are used.  See further E. Jackson, ‘What is a Parent?’ in A. Diduck and K. O’Donovan (eds), Feminist 
Perspectives on Family Law (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2006). 
 
86
 Under s 35 or s 42 respectively. 
 
87
 On the assimilationist model adopted in the Civil Partnership Act 2004, see N. Barker, ‘For Better or For Worse? 
The Civil Partnership Bill [HL] 2004’ (2004) 26 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 313; C. F. Stychin, 
'"Las Vegas is not where we are":  Queer Readings of the Civil Partnership Act', (2006) 25 Political Geography 899. 
 
88
 While ss. 35 and 36 do not affect the pater est presumption, it may be rebutted by evidence (e.g a DNA test) 
showing that the husband is not the child’s genetic father. In that case, a man in respect of whom the agreed 
fatherhood conditions were satisfied would be the child’s father under s 36. There is no presumption parallel to the 
pater est presumption in common law for people who enter a civil partnership and, as such, the provisions which 
would otherwise apply to determine parenthood will not be affected by the mother entering into a civil partnership 
after the transfer of an embryo or gametes. 
 
89
 In the context of non-licensed treatment when a woman is neither married nor in a civil partnership, the provider 
of the sperm is the child’s legal parent under the common law.   
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rather than through sexual intercourse.
90
  That this significant change appears to have passed 
largely unnoticed is evidence of the lack of scrutiny received by the status provisions, which we 
noted above.  
 
The ongoing distinction drawn between married and unmarried fathers (and, indeed, its extension 
to civil partnered female couples and those not in such a partnership) is interesting in the context 
of widespread erosion of the relevance of this distinction elsewhere in family law, a trend which 
gathered momentum in the 1970s and is currently continued in the Welfare Reform Bill 2009.
91
   
In the face of such a trend, why did the architects of the reform of the 2008 Act retain and build 
on this distinction here?  The roots of this prioritisation of marriage appear to lie in anxieties 
during the passage of the 1990 Act regarding the use of reproductive technologies and the 
perceived threats which they posed to the nuclear family.
92
  Twenty years on, the failure to 
challenge a distinction which is now even further out of line with current family law and policy 
lies in the constraints on the reform process which we noted above: the 2008 Act is an amending 
statute, which builds on the structure of the 1990 Act.   Further, reform in this area is conducted 
in the harsh spotlight of media attention: the clear sense of those overseeing the drafting of the 
legislation was that to challenge the distinction between married and unmarried couples ran the 
risk of being taken to be attacking marriage and thus liable to attract very hostile coverage.
93
  
The result is a piece of legislation which, in maintaining a clear distinction between formally 
recognised and other relationships, is now very significantly out of line with broader family law 
principles.   
 
The Two Parent Model 
 
                                                 
90
 The current practice by Registrars is that generally no evidence will be required unless the Registrar has reason to 
believe that those persons seeking to register the birth are providing false information.  In correspondence, Trembath 
indicated the following: ‘As you say, where legal parentage is not conferred on the mother's female partner because 
they were not in a civil partnership (and the mother was not married), and treatment was not carried out at a clinic in 
the UK or consent had not been properly given, the partner could not legally be registered as the parent. The 
biological position would then apply i.e. the man who had intercourse with the mother or donated sperm for a DIY 
insemination would be the father and could be registered a[s] such. Where there is any dispute between the parties as 
to the means of conception or status of the parents, before registering the birth the registrar will seek further 
information or ask to see relevant documentation as appropriate (e.g. confirmation from the clinic of the treatment, 
consent forms etc) in order to establish the correct parentage. In any circumstances, only two people may be 
regarded as the parents so in a case where all three parties wish to be registered as parents, the registrar will have to 
defer registration and take whatever action is appropriate to establish the correct parentage.’  While documentation 
may be available to confirm or deny that treatment took place at a licensed clinic, what the Registrar would ask for 
by way of evidence that conception took place ‘artificially’ rather than through sexual intercourse in the self-
arranged context remains an interesting empirical question and one that poses the further consideration of what the 
distinction in the provision actually seeks to achieve.  Trembath, e-mail on file. 
  
91
 This aims to ensure joint registration of all births and provides that parental responsibility will be automatically 
acquired by an unmarried man (or non-civil partnered female partner) who registers as a child’s father (or female 
parent) under these new provisions: see Sched 6, Part 2, Clause 21.   
 
92
 See further Dewar, Sheldon, n 60 above. 
 
93
 Webb interview, on file: ‘if we changed the recognition of married men or marriage, people might see that as the 
Government attacking marriage.  So we always have to be mindful of the bigger political picture as well...’   
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In the context of widespread political and cultural disagreement regarding on what grounds 
parents should be recognised, acceptance of the fact that we can have two – and only two – ‘real’ 
parents has proved a unifying article of faith.
94
  The two parent model retains a grip on the law 
which appears to have outlived any inevitable relationship between legal parenthood and either 
biological fact or marital convention.   Significantly, while the reform of s 13(5) ensured that 
there was sustained attention to the question of whether a child could flourish equally well 
without a father (either in a single parent family or raised by a same sex couple), this reform 
process saw no discussion of the question of whether, if two parents are better than one, three 
parents might be better than (or, at least, as good as) two. In other contexts, family law has 
developed increasingly flexible and creative ways of recognising a range of adults as of 
significance to a child.  To take just two examples: parental responsibility can be awarded to any 
number of adults and current adoption practice seeks to maintain links with birth parents 
alongside those with legal/social parents.
95
  Yet it seems that notwithstanding this greater 
flexibility, there remains something special about the legal status of parent and registration as 
such on a birth certificate.  The question of whether, in certain circumstances, more than two 
parents might be legally recognised was raised by just one respondent early in the Government 
consultation process regarding how the 1990 Act should be reformed
96
 and, although noted in 
two consecutive interventions in the House of Lords debates, was not subject to any further 
elaboration.
97
  Given that for the vast majority of births only two adults will be involved in the 
child’s conception, intend to be the parents and be accordingly registered on the birth certificate, 
one might be forgiven for assuming that the issue of multiple birth registration simply did not 
occur to the Government as a matter for consideration.  However, the Department of Health told 
us that they had mooted the possibility of a child having three legal parents in the early stages of 
the reform process and discussed it with the Office for National Statistics.  The idea was rejected 
on the basis that the consequences of such a change were too far reaching and controversial, 
potentially ‘hijacking’ the reform process and jeopardising the Bill.98   
 
Within the wide-ranging consequences foreseen by the Department of Health, there may, of 
course, be very good reasons for refusing to recognise more than two legal parents.  Perhaps 
most obviously, such a refusal might be grounded in a concern for the best interests of a child.  
                                                 
 
94 
On the fact that such claims to authenticity (being a ‘real’ parent) are grounded in claims to exclusivity (only one 
mother and one father can be ‘real’ parents), see further Sheldon, n 60 above; Jackson, n 85 above. 
 
95
 See Children Act 1989, s 2 and C. Ball, ‘Regulating Inclusivity: Reforming Adoption Law for the 21st Century’ 
(2002) 7 Child and Family Social Work 285. 
 
96
 AHRC Centre for Law, Gender And Sexuality, Response to the Public Consultation on the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act, response to question 56, available at:  
http://www.kent.ac.uk/clgs/documents/clgshfearespfinal.pdf.  Sheldon was involved in writing this submission. 
 
97 Per Baroness O’Neill of Bengarve and Baroness Baker, HL Deb vol 696 col 858-861 (21 November 2007). 
 
98
 The Department of Health also clearly felt that a statute aimed at a very specific area of law was not the right 
place to introduce wide-ranging reform of fundamental family law principles: ‘Three people wanting to parent a 
child ... there is nothing necessarily wrong with it, it’s just the whole concept of parenthood would be altered with 
huge cost ...’, Skinner, interview on file; ‘all of a sudden a child’s got three parents? Let’s try to stick to ... the 
structure we’ve already got’, Webb, interview on file. 
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We might worry that potential conflict would inevitably follow from a multiplication of the 
number of parents, or that a child with three parents might find the arrangement confusing or 
face stigma from peers.  These are, however, empirical concerns which, to the best of our 
knowledge, have not been investigated and thus remain entirely speculative.  The Department of 
Health’s early policy decision and lack of further attention to this issue signals just how 
ingrained in our collective imagination is the notion that a child has only two parents, even in the 
context of assisted reproduction where more than two people may contribute biologically to the 
reproductive process.  Indeed, as was noted above and is further discussed below, the possibility 
that two women might both lay claim to be recognised as mothers on the basis of biological links 
(leaving a third party to claim fatherhood or female parenthood) was considered worthy of 
specific exclusion.  It is also clear that any attempt to introduce a third parent onto the birth 
certificate was seen as very difficult to implement in political terms, invoking the remit of a large 
number of different Government departments.
99
  
 
The limited amount of consideration given to the advantages and disadvantages of recognising 
more than two parents is particularly interesting given that a growing number of other 
jurisdictions have begun to countenance such a possibility.  The New Zealand Law Commission 
has recommended changes to the law to permit a child to have three legal parents in certain 
reproductive contexts: notably, when a couple conceive a child with a known donor
100
 and in 
situations whereby the wrong gametes have been used in treatment procedures.
101
 The New 
Zealand Government has resolved to give these recommendations further consideration.
102
 In 
Canada, the Ontario Court of Appeal has ruled that it could bridge a ‘legislative gap’ in the 
Children’s Law Reform Act 1990 by allowing a child to have three registered legal parents.103  
Again, this was in the context of a lesbian couple conceiving a child with a known donor and the 
Ontario Court found that not to allow the child’s non-biological mother also to register as the 
child’s legal parent along with the biological parents was a violation of her rights under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
104
  Meanwhile, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
                                                 
99
 Willis, Skinner, interview on file.  Relevant departments would include the Home Office, the Office for National 
Statistics, the Department of Work and Pensions and a number of others. 
 
100
  New Zealand Law Commission, New Issues in Legal Parenthood, Report 88 (2005), recommendation 10, paras 
6.60-6.73. 
 
101
 ibid, recommendation 16, paras 8.15-8.17.  This may have been a particularly useful legal mechanism in the UK 
case The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v Mr and Mrs A and Others [2003] EWCA 259 (QBD), as 
considered by Sheldon, n 60 above, at 544-547.  The Law Commission’s Report also notes that although the New 
Zealand courts have never recognised a child as having more than two legal parents it has, in H v Y [2005] NZFLR 
152, paved the way for a declaration of paternity to be issued in relation to an adopted person who already has a 
legal father.  No legal rights or responsibilities would, however, flow from this declaration. 
 
102
 Ministry of Justice, Government Response to the Law Commission Report on New Issues in Legal Parenthood 
(2006), paras 23-27 and 33-34.   
 
103
 In AA v BB (2007) ONCA 2. 
 
104
 Specifically her rights to equality and fundamental justice under ss 15 and 7 respectively. 
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has held that a child may have three legal parents for the purposes of child support.
105
  In all 
these examples, how it may be beneficial for a child to have three registered legal parents was 
discussed, moving the deliberations on this issue beyond mere assumption that it would in some 
way be harmful.
106
  Yet in the UK, despite the lack of political or cultural consensus on what 
actually makes someone a parent, the idea that a child benefit from having more than two parents 
appears to have been too radical to have merited any discussion in this context, leaving the 
reformers to rely on the sexual family ‘two parent’ model as the default option.   
 
 
‘Parental dimorphism’: one mother plus one father/female parent  
 
Further, while English law has become increasingly open to the idea that a child can have two 
parents of the same gender, the sexual family model continues to resonate in a steadfast 
resistance to the possibility that a child can have two ‘mothers’ (or indeed two ‘fathers’).107  The 
two parent model thus also appears to encompass an assumption of what might be loosely termed 
‘parental dimorphism’, by which we mean that the two parents are seen as occupying 
complementary yet different legal roles.  This was seen above in the fact that a lesbian co-mother 
is not to be legally recognised as a ‘mother’ (a status reserved for the woman who has gestated a 
pregnancy) but as a ‘female parent’ (a status awarded on grounds which closely parallel those by 
which men obtain fatherhood).  The 2008 Act further provides that references elsewhere in law 
to ‘father’ should be taken to include ‘female parent’.108   
 
This points to another significant dimension of the sexual family: that it is rooted in the idea of 
complementarity, assuming a fundamental difference in how parental status is acquired.
109
  As 
has been seen above, motherhood is firmly grounded in gestation (and this holds significance per 
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 Jennifer L. Shultz-Jacob v Jodilynn Jacob and Carl Frampton [2007] PA Super 118.  It is here interesting to note 
that if the Welfare Reform Bill (2009) is passed in its current form, it would seem to prohibit such a possibility.  See 
Sched 6, Part 1, clause 4 and clause 13 (inserting ss 2E, 10B and 10C into the Births and Deaths Registration Act 
1953), which would allow for the re-registration of a birth only when the birth is solely registered by the mother. 
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 McCandless has elsewhere discussed this in the context of a recent application for parental responsibility by a 
known donor that was objected to by the lesbian couple who were the primary carers of the child: n 84 above. 
  
107
 Note that adoption certificates use the gender neutral terminology of ‘parent’ for each parent rather than ‘mother’ 
and ‘father’.  This meant that following the changes in the Adoption and Children Act 2002, which permit a same-
sex couple to adopt a child together, the semantics of ‘mother/mother’ or ‘father/father’ were avoided.  Trembath, e-
mail on file. 
 
108
 See the changes made to the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 and other relevant legislation by Sched 6, 
Part 1 of the 2008 Act (and Part 2 for enactments relating only to Scotland).   A further question which arises was 
whether, rather than providing for these separate gendered statuses, the law might simply have moved to a position 
of ‘parent one’ and ‘parent two’.  Yet as Skinner told us: ‘We didn’t want to take away the term ‘mother’ or the term 
‘father’, which are emotive terms for most people and they would want to keep them for heterosexual couples and 
women would want to keep ‘mother’.’  Interview, on file.    
 
109
 Although Fineman is more concerned with the gendered imagery of the sexual family in relation to care-work, as 
opposed to how it plays out in the attribution of legal parenthood per se, this sense of complementarity appears to be 
an implicit part of the sexual family model, which in its pure form requires a male and female parent, each of whom 
is genetically related to the child.  
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se, rather than merely standing as a proxy for a genetic link).
110
  Law’s interest in genetic links 
has thus tended to be focussed on fathers.
111
  Indeed, as noted above, the possibility of acquiring 
either motherhood or ‘female parenthood’ through a genetic link is explicitly addressed – and 
excluded – in the 2008 Act.112  The grounds for such exclusion are not readily evident.  No 
rationale was given for it in the explanatory notes accompanying the 2008 Act and there is no 
discussion of it in the Parliamentary debates,
113
 suggesting that it either passed unnoticed or was 
felt to be entirely uncontroversial.  Two explanations were offered for the provision during the 
course of our interviews.  First, and almost certainly most significantly, was the perceived need 
to avoid any future possibility that two women might each claim to be recognised as the mother 
of a child citing, respectively, gestational and genetic connections.  Such claims would be most 
likely to arise in the context of a lesbian couple who wish both to enjoy a biological connection 
with a future child and therefore choose to create an embryo from one partner’s ova, which will 
be implanted in the other partner.
114
 As we noted above, recognising two women as parents in 
this way would leave open the possibility that a third party might also attempt to assert legal 
parenthood.  Second, it was suggested to us that the provision might reflect concerns about 
mitochondrial DNA donation, seeking to head off the possibility that a donor might assert some 
parental claims on this basis.
115
  While such a provision appears unnecessary given the clear 
definitions of legal motherhood and female parenthood provided in the statute, this section might 
be taken as providing what one interviewee suggested to be ‘clarity’ and, another, a ‘belt and 
braces’ approach.116  
 
Whether legally necessary or not, this explicit rebuttal of any possibility that female parenthood 
might be grounded in genetic links serves to emphasise the distinction between how we think 
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 As might have been thought to be implied by the phrase, mater est quam gestatio demonstrate (is gestation 
nothing more than the demonstration of a genetic connection?).    
 
111
 This is not to deny that law recognises other genetic links: e.g. in inheritance law and incest prohibitions.  
Further, as noted above, the 2008 Act increases the rights of children born of gamete donation to trace their (half-) 
siblings: see Jones, n 46 above. 
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 s 47.   
 
113
 When this provision was discussed at Committee stage in the House of Commons the only question posed in 
relation to it was whether children born through egg donation would have a similar right of access to information as 
children born through the use of donated sperm.  See per Mark Simmonds MP, Commons Committee Stage Debate, 
7
th
 Sitting, col 240 (12 June 2008).   
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 Webb confirmed this understanding: ‘it is about a very clear principle that the woman that gives birth is the 
mother and that’s it... There was something about the need to make it absolutely clear that where we have two 
women in a relationship and one provides the egg to the other and she gives birth that it would be absolutely clear, in 
that situation, the donor is not the mother.’  Interview on file. 
 
115
 Willis, interview on file.  Beyond s 47, we saw further anxiety associated with female procreativity in the Joint 
Committee’s recommendation that an embryo made from the genetic material of two women alone should be 
prohibited for use in treatment and that, in the case of mitochondrial donation, the child would have only two legal 
parents. JC Report, paras 186 and 307. 
  
116
 Skinner, Jackson, interviews on file.   As Jackson went on to acknowledge, this flies against a received principle 
of statutory interpretation: that the draftsman should be taken not to have included unnecessary words in a statute. 
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about motherhood and fatherhood: while genetic connections are very relevant to establishing 
fatherhood, legal motherhood is a status emphatically grounded in gestation.
117
  This distinction 
in how men and women are able to acquire parental status has a significant impact in practice.  
Imagine a non-civil partnered lesbian couple, Jacqui and Jill, who both wish to enjoy a biological 
connection with a jointly planned child and thus decide that Jacqui will donate an egg that will 
be fertilised with donor semen, with the resulting embryo implanted into Jill.  Jill will thus be the 
child’s legal mother and Jacqui can achieve female parenthood on the basis of an agreement with 
Jill, which meets the statutorily prescribed conditions.   However, now imagine that Jacqui and 
Jill separate before an embryo is implanted.  Jacqui can of course ask the clinic to destroy the 
stored embryos which were created using her eggs.
118
  However, if she fails to do so there is 
nothing to prevent Jill from informing the clinic that she no longer wishes Jacqui to be the agreed 
second parent and having these embryos implanted (with or without another partner recognised 
as legal father/female parent).  Although the clinic has an obligation to take ‘reasonable steps’ to 
inform Jacqui before the embryos are used (thus giving her the opportunity to withdraw consent), 
there is no prohibition on use of the embryos if such ‘reasonable steps’ do not result in contact 
being established.
119
  As such, if the agreed parenthood conditions are no longer met (e.g. 
because Jill has informed the clinic that she no longer wishes Jacqui to be the agreed second 
parent or because she has formed a legally binding agreement with a new partner), Jacqui might 
thus find herself in a position where she has no legal rights at all with regard to the genetic child 
that she jointly planned with Jill.
120
  
 
A man who has contributed sperm to create an embryo to be implanted in his partner would not 
find himself in a similar position because he would achieve fatherhood not on the basis of the 
agreed fatherhood conditions but on the basis of his genetic connection with the resulting child, 
as per the common law.  This points to a broader problem with the current framing of the agreed 
female parenthood provisions, which seek to extend legal recognition to lesbian co-parents on 
exactly parallel conditions to those by which men acquire legal recognition as fathers: in some 
instances, parallel treatment will deliver unequal results because men and women are not 
similarly (biologically) situated with regard to reproduction.  It is noteworthy that while there 
was some, albeit limited, discussion regarding whether ‘female parents’ ought to be recognised 
at all, once that decision was made, how one might seek to frame such recognition appears to 
have received very little critical scrutiny, with our interviewees generally perplexed by the 
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 On this, see further, Sheldon, n 60 above at 546-7.  For the contention that greater weight should be placed on the 
genetic tie for all parents, see A. Samuels ‘The Surrogate Child: Who is his or her Mother and Who is the Father?’ 
(2000) 68 Medico-Legal Journal 65.   
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 As per the consent provisions contained in Sched 3. 
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 S 14(6E) 1990 Act, as amended.  See further above, n 66. 
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  It is interesting to speculate whether Jacqui might invoke a Human Rights Act challenge on such a set of facts.  
Jacqui’s Article 8 privacy rights appear to be clearly engaged in such a context.  Can she also produce a convincing 
argument under Article 14 that she is discriminated against relative to a man (who, where he is the genetic father of 
the child, would not be caught by these provisions in the same way)?    
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question of whether this might have been done in any other way.
121
  The Department of Health 
reported a strategy of working outwards from the provisions for heterosexual couples to ensure 
‘complete equality between the two’:  
 
So, we started with married couples and then read across to civil partners, and then having done something 
for civil partners,  we considered the position of unmarried heterosexual couples and the  ‘treated together’ 
provision ... [Notes the imprecision of the ‘treatment together’ test and the welcome opportunity to tighten 
up that wording] ... We’ve got a more precise provision now of signing a fatherhood agreement before 
insemination or embryo transfer, which can be withdrawn before that takes place ... And, having done that 
for unmarried heterosexual couples,  we considered the position of non-civil partners and introduced the 
parental agreement there.  That was the process.
122
 
 
The Department also reported that it had met several times to discuss the reform with Stonewall, 
a group which has been subject to some criticism for its assimilationist approach to the 
recognition of same sex relationships.
123
  The small number of LGBT groups that replied to the 
consultation exercises noted above applauded the extension of parental recognition, with no 
critical comment as to its form,
124
 and there was similarly little discussion in the Science and 
Technology Committee, Joint Committee or in Parliament on this question.  Yet as Diduck has 
explored in a different context, there are grounds to be wary of any straightforward assumption 
that lesbian families are ‘just like other families’.  The differences in how lesbian couples may 
choose to structure their parenting arrangements are crucial and Diduck suggests that law needs 
to recognise this difference rather than simply viewing it as a distraction.
125
   
 
Finally, it is also worth pausing to consider where gay men figure in this extension of parental 
recognition through the status provisions.  To our knowledge, this issue was raised only once in 
the entire, extensive reform process described above and then by a respondent who was arguing 
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 The Department of Health told us that they described to their lawyers what they wanted to achieve in practice, 
and the lawyers produced the text of the agreed fatherhood and female parenthood conditions. Webb, interview on 
file. 
 
122
 Webb, interview on file.  
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 For a critique of Stonewall as advocating a model of reform that tends to promote formal equality in a socially 
conservative, assimiliationist way, see Stychin, n 87 above. 
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 e.g. the only LGBT group who replied to the JC’s consultation was the Equality Network (ev 33), a network of 
Scottish organisations working for LGBT equality.  The Network’s submission welcomed the proposal to remove 
sexual orientation discrimination from the Act, noting that ‘the principle of treating the civil partner of a mother in 
the same way as the husband of a mother, and treating a “non-civil-partnered” same-sex partner the same as an 
unmarried mixed-sex partner, is now well established in other law.  It is also supported by the increasing amount of 
evidence on outcomes for children of same-sex parents...’ JC Vol 2, at 353. 
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 A. Diduck, n.77 above.  Diduck’s own brief discussion of Part 2 of the 2008 Act is unsurprisingly highly critical.  
Jenni Millbank makes a similar point in an insightful recent overview of lesbian and gay intra-familial disputes in a 
number of western nations, noting that: ‘Many parenting reforms have proceeded under an equal treatment 
approach, analogising co-mothers with the position of non-biological parents in heterosexual families.  There is 
much appeal in such an approach, which I am not necessarily criticising, however it has produced very little 
engagement with the underlying principles or discussion of the ‘fit’ in its application to lesbian-led families.’ See J. 
Millbank, ‘The Limits of Functional Family: Lesbian Mother Litigation in the Era of the Eternal Biological Family’ 
(2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 149, at 169. 
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for a more conservative approach to reform.
126
  Gay men do benefit from the extension of the 
possibility of obtaining a ‘fast track’ adoption following surrogacy;127 however it seems not to 
have been considered that the status provisions might be further adapted to allow two men to be 
recognised as parents from the moment of birth.  Again, this can be explained through the 
tenacious hold of the two-parent sexually dimorphic family model on our thinking.  Within this 
model, at least as it has played out in the UK context, motherhood is grounded in gestation.  In 
1990, the law took a step away from the ‘pure’ form of the sexual family, by recognising that a 
woman’s partner might be recognised as the legal father even if not the genetic father of her 
child, on the basis of his relationship to the woman and his intention to create a child.  Given the 
operation of the longstanding previous legal presumption of pater est, this was not such a large 
change.
128
  In the 2008 Act, this shift is extended one step further: similarly to recognise a 
woman’s female partner.  However, to recognise two gay men as parents under the status 
provisions would be a significant step further again, and one which simply stretches the current 
legal imagination too far, as it would involve moving beyond the idea that the birth mother is a 
legal mother (or, alternatively, recognising three parents from the moment of birth).  While the 
law in this area has been open to the idea that fatherhood can be grounded in intention (and 
avoided on the same basis), the same has been less true of motherhood.
129
  Thus, given the 
resistance to recognising more than two parents, gay men are squeezed out of the picture.   
 
The (potentially) sexual couple 
 
As noted above, husbands and civil partners have ‘first shot’ at obtaining legal parenthood along 
with the child’s birth mother. Such couples will normally be in a sexually intimate relationship130 
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 Brenda Almond, an emeritus Professor of Philosophy suggested that ‘caution is needed when tampering with 
something as fundamental as having a parent of each sex’.  She notes that while the changes to the status provisions 
are proposed in the name of gender equality, the principle is applied inconsistently, with the Bill’s proposals 
couched entirely in terms of women.  She concludes that ‘[a]ny reasoning that could justify these proposals in 
respect of women could equally justify similar arrangements for men.’ Her argument would appear to have been 
intended to function as a reductio ad absurdum.  JC, Vol 2, Ev 21 at 2.2. 
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 See s 54 2008 Act, extending the category of couples who can apply for a parental order (fast track adoption) 
following surrogacy to civil partners, and unmarried opposite sex couples and non-civil partners who are an 
‘enduring family relationship’ and not in prohibited degrees of relationship to each other. In contrast with adoption, 
single people cannot apply for a parental order. 
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 While the marital presumption could be rebutted by evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the 
husband could not be the father, the law for many years refused in the interests of public decency to allow either 
party to give evidence that they had not had intercourse at the relevant time: see Cretney n 78 above at 533-6 for a 
detailed and insightful discussion of the case law. 
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 Gillian Douglas has suggested that focussing on intention reflects a very male way of thinking about parenthood 
and US author Karen Czapanskiy expresses a similar idea in a different context, suggesting that while women are 
‘draftees’ into parenthood, men are ‘volunteers’.   G. Douglas, ‘The Intention to be a Parent and the Making of 
Mothers’ (1994) 57 MLR 636; K. Czapanskiy ‘Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality’ (1991) 
38 University of California Los Angeles Law Review 415.  On the need for a conceptual division between maternity 
and motherhood see K. O’Donovan and J. Marshall, ‘After Birth: Decisions About Becoming a Mother’ in Diduck 
and O’Donovan, n 85 above. 
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 Note that lack of consummation remains as a ground for annulment of a marriage.  No similar provision is made 
with regard to civil partnership, although see N. Barker, 'Sex and the Civil Partnership Act: The Future of  
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and must, at least, be lawfully permitted to be so: marriage and civil partnership are not open to 
those in the prohibited degrees of relationship foreseen in incest legislation.
131
  As we have seen, 
those who do not achieve fatherhood/female parenthood through a formally recognised union, 
can do so through the agreed fatherhood and female parenthood conditions.  While these were 
clearly designed to cater for couples, they are not explicitly restricted to those in a sexually 
intimate relationship.
132
  However, as we noted above, legal recognition under these provisions 
cannot be accorded to those who fall within the prohibited degrees of relationship with the 
child’s mother, as foreseen in incest legislation.  There is nothing in the published deliberations 
regarding the rationale for including the incest prohibition and no significant discussion of this 
provision in the parliamentary debates, suggesting its inclusion to be uncontroversial and thus to 
require no elucidation.  The prohibition also occurs in adoption regulation, and it is clear that this 
was an important influence on the drafters’ decision to include it here.133  Such a prohibition is 
unlikely to be grounded in eugenic considerations, which do not arise in cases of gamete 
donation.  Rather, as one of the senior civil servants whom we interviewed at the Department of 
Health put it:  
 
you’ve got incest from the point of view of genetic material being damaged ... but then is there just 
generally an idea of something not quite being right about a mother and sister raising a child together, in a 
legally recognised partnership?  So that’s why we looked at adoption.  That’s where we could draw the 
comparison.
134
 
 
To recognise as legal parents two people who ought not to be involved in a sexual relationship 
because of existing kinship relationships would, it appears, offend some deeply held but unstated 
value, confusing our ideas about family.  Thus, while we suggested above that the two parent 
model might be seen as having outlived its moorings in the heterosexual couple, the sexual 
family model continues here to frame our understanding in so far as the couple at the heart of the 
family remains a sexual one. 
It is worth pausing to consider here the self-evident necessity of this provision.  Why is it that a 
mother and daughter should not both be legally recognised as parents?  We know that these kinds 
of collaborative parenting arrangements occur as a matter of social fact: for example, where a 
mother and father raise a child with their own daughter, who has become pregnant at a young age 
whilst still living at home.  Many would see this as the ideal arrangement in which a teenage 
mother might raise her child and certainly would not see anything wrong in her own parents 
taking on a substantial parenting role with respect to the new baby.  What then is different about 
allowing individuals in these kinds of relationships to choose to create a child together, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Non-Conjugality' (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 241, for an argument that this has more to do with a political 
reluctance to discuss same-sex sex than the idea that civil partnerships would not entail a sexual relationship. 
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 See n 68 above.  
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 As was noted above, the fact that the provision was not restricted to ‘partners’ was only noticed by many 
relatively late in the reform process. 
 
133
 Skinner, interview on file. 
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 Webb, interview on file. 
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recognising all of them on a birth certificate?  It is clear from the discussion above that the 
answer cannot lie in the fact that we believe legal parenthood should always follow genetic links 
or that it is dependent in some way on a marital relationship between the parents. 
One interesting case which might offer a useful prompt to tease out intuitions was reported under 
the title, ‘Sisters make baby with three mums’.135  Alex was infertile as a result of chemotherapy.  
When she and her husband decided to start a family, her twin sister, Charlotte, agreed to donate 
an egg, while her other sister, Helen, offered to gestate the pregnancy.  The resulting child, 
Charlie, was thus created from Charlotte's egg and Alex's husband's sperm, and gestated by 
Helen.  The report which accompanies this story on the BBC website is accompanied by a 
picture of a smiling Alex holding Charlie, and flanked by her two sisters.  Whilst there is no way 
of knowing the extent to which the positive tone of the BBC report might be representative of 
broader opinion, it is noteworthy that the story represents these events as a laudable act of 
familial support, rather than one which suggests concerns for the future wellbeing of Charlie, 
who will, after all, be raised within the confines of a (hetero)sexual family unit.  However, would 
reactions to this story be different if the three sisters lived together and intended collectively to 
raise him, having chosen this method of conception in order that they each might have a 
significant connection with Charlie (as primary carer, genetic and gestational parent), which they 
would wish to see legally recognised?  Would the idea that Charlie had ‘three mums’ become 
less palatable in such a case?  And, if so, is there a solid ethical underpinning for such an 
intuition, which merits its translation into legal prohibition?   
Our purpose here is not to offer a normative evaluation of the merits of the inclusion of the incest 
prohibition but to highlight that these kinds of normative questions were only addressed in a very 
limited way in this reform process.  Any possibility that we might extend parenthood to two 
individuals who were already in a close kinship relationship appears to have been self-evidently 
wrong to the law-makers. Read alongside the guidance which the HFEA has provided on how 
clinicians should interpret the newly revised welfare clause, it appears that while it may be 
desirable for a woman’s family to help her to raise a child, it is not similarly acceptable for 
family members to seek to create a child together, or at least not in a way that is formally 
recognised through law.
136
 
Transgender parents 
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 ‘ONE life -Three Sisters Make One Baby’, BBC 1 (31 October 2005).  See the accompanying report on the BBC 
website: ‘Sisters make baby with three mums’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4370804.stm (last accessed 12 May 
2008). 
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 The recently published latest edition of the Code of Practice advises clinics that where they have some cause for 
concern regarding a woman’s ability to provide ‘supportive parenting’ (as required by s 13(5), as amended), they 
may also take account of support offered by family and friends.  The following definition of ‘supportive parenting’ 
is given: ‘commitment to the health, well being and development of the child. It is presumed that all prospective 
parents will be supportive parents, in the absence of any reasonable cause for concern that any child who may be 
born, or any other child, may be at risk of significant harm or neglect.  Where centres have concern as to whether 
this commitment exists, they may wish to take account of wider family and social networks within which the child 
will be raised.’ HFEA Code of Practice (8th Edition), at para 8.11. 
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We end this consideration of the ‘sexual family’ underpinnings of the 2008 Act, by considering 
the case of transgender parents, who offer a further illustration of some of the tensions described 
above and, we would suggest, a store of thorny problems for future judicial determination.  Take 
the case of X, a female-to-male transsexual and his (female) partner, Y, who had together 
obtained infertility treatment services using donor semen.
137
  X had been present throughout Y’s 
treatment, had acknowledged himself to be the father of any children conceived and was now 
playing an active parenting role.  Nonetheless, he was told that he could not be registered on the 
birth certificate of the resulting child, Z.  X took his case to the European Court of Human 
Rights, where he lost.
138
   
 
Under the 2008 Act, a future X would be able to register as a female parent.   And further 
developments since his case was heard would also offer him a second, potentially more 
attractive, possibility.  At the time that X went to the courts, English law defined a person’s sex 
by reference to biological criteria at birth and allowed no possibility for it to be subsequently 
reassigned.
139
  This position has now been radically altered by the Gender Recognition Act 2004 
(‘the 2004 Act’) which, under certain conditions, allows for legal recognition of an individual’s 
new gender.  This allows for X to become legally a man, should he so choose, and therefore to be 
in a position to achieve legal recognition as a father.  Previous parental roles are not affected by 
such a change,
140
 raising the intriguing possibility that a female-to-male transsexual might 
simultaneously be a mother to children born prior to gender reassignment and a father to those 
conceived afterwards via infertility treatment services.  Likewise, a male-to-female transsexual 
might be a father to children born before reassignment and a ‘female parent’ to those born after 
it.  However, the correct terminology for someone who is now a male ‘mother’ or female ‘father’ 
remains elusive.  A Conservative MP who raised this issue in the debates which preceded the 
2004 Act’s introduction in the House of Commons received a somewhat evasive response from 
the Government:   
 
[Widdecome]: If a woman who has lived her life as a woman, has been registered at birth as a woman and 
has borne children decides that she wishes to change gender to become fully a man, and the birth certificate 
is rewritten to reflect that, who is the legal mother of those children? 
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 X, Y and Z v the UK (1997) 24 ECHR 143. 
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The majority of the Court held that while his privacy rights under Article 8 were engaged, they had not been 
violated.  Any potential disadvantages suffered by the applicants were limited since X was not prevented from 
acting as a social father and could apply for a joint residence order, which would give him parental responsibility.  
One of the judges commented that ‘it is self-evident that a person who is manifestly not the father of a child has no 
right to be recognised as her father.’ Ibid, at 175.  See A. Bainham, ‘Sex, Gender and Fatherhood: Does Biology 
Really Matter?’ (1997) 56 Cambridge Law Journal 512 at 515.  More recently, in Goodwin v UK [2002] 2 FLR 487 
and I v UK [2002] 2 FLR 518, the Court has found that a failure to recognise a change in status for post-operative 
transsexuals no longer fell within a State’s margin of appreciation, as an emerging consensus in favour of granting 
legal recognition could be discerned. 
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 Corbett v Corbett [1970] 2 All ER 33, R v Tan [1983] QB 1053, B v B [2001] 1 FLR 389. 
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 s 12, 2004 Act.   
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[Lammy]: She is the parent of those children and she has acquired a new gender.
141
 
 
In his resort to the gender neutral term, ‘parent’, David Lammy appears to sense a safer way of 
describing the post-operative parental relationship, avoiding the conclusion that a child could 
have no legal mother but rather two legal fathers or vice-versa.  The same semantic strategy is 
invoked in the context of same-sex adoption, where a couple will find themselves each registered 
as a child’s ‘parent’.  This avoids a direct challenge to the parental dimorphism noted above and 
side-steps the issue of whether being a ‘father’ or ‘mother’ means nothing more than being a 
male or female parent or whether ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are distinct and complementary roles, 
with distinct accompanying social expectations.
142
 
 
It is likely that transgender parents will pose further significant challenges for the courts charged 
with interpreting the 2008 Act in the future.  Another case recently reported in the British press 
concerned Thomas Beatie, an American transgender man who, despite having undergone gender 
reassignment (legally and physically), had retained the ability to gestate a pregnancy and, faced 
with his wife’s inability to do so, decided to become pregnant.  He has since given birth to a 
daughter and is expecting a second child.  Beatie is certainly not the first transgender man to give 
birth,
143
 though it is possible that he is the first legally recognised as such to do so.  Given that 
under the 2004 Act a person can become legally male while still retaining their female 
reproductive capacity,
144
 Beatie’s case illustrates some problems which may yet come to be 
faced by the UK courts.   
 
First, ought a clinic in the UK attempt to help such a couple to have a child and should the HFEA 
license such treatment?
145
 Having been refused by several clinics, Beatie and his wife resorted to 
home insemination following the purchase of anonymous sperm from a commercial sperm 
bank.
146
  This echoes the experiences of a Spanish transgender man, Rubén Noé Coronado 
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delay transition in order to do so. 
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 As reported in Thomas Beatie’s first person account to The Advocate magazine, available at 
http://www.advocate.com/exclusive_detail_ektid52947.asp (last accessed 16 April 2009).  A total of nine doctors 
were involved in initial requests.  Beatie further comments: ‘Doctors have discriminated against us, turning us away 
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Jiménez, who reportedly contacted 158 clinics in Spain before finding one which was prepared 
to treat him before he underwent full surgical reassignment.
147
  Yet despite the evident 
discomfort some people felt at the idea of a man being visibly pregnant, Beatie and his wife are 
causing no direct harm to anyone else, appearing merely to have the same desire as many other 
couples to share genetic and gestational connections with their child.
148
   
 
Secondly, if such a procedure were permitted in the UK, who would be recognised as the parents 
of that child?  The man who has gestated the pregnancy should presumably be seen as the child’s 
mother, though whether that is compatible with his status as a man is unclear.
149
  Likewise, if a 
male-to-female transsexual has stored sperm prior to reassignment which is then used to 
impregnate a female partner, would she be the child’s ‘father’ or ‘female parent’, and will this 
depend on the genetic connection or the person’s current legal gender?  And if womb transplants 
become possible in the future, could she ask to make use of the sperm to create an embryo which 
she could then gestate herself?
150
 
 
Other authors have already provided an interesting analysis of the reproductive possibilities at 
play here and the extent to which the 2008 Act would struggle to address them.
151
  Our own aim 
is merely to provide one further example of how the ‘sexual family’ notion struggles to 
accommodate such possibilities.  Indeed, the questions posed by transgender parenthood serve to 
illuminate many of the tensions inherent in continuing to map our legal determinations of 
parenthood to a family model that is unmoored from its traditional underpinnings. Once the 
various constituent elements of the family form envisaged in the sexual family model are no 
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longer all tightly contained within one couple, then tension between them is inevitable.  Further, 
the transgender example illustrates well the extent of the challenges that the use of reproductive 
technologies pose to current understandings of parenthood and how many of these have passed 
unaddressed in this reform process and the revised legislation resulting from it.
152
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In late March 2009, some four months after the 2008 Act had received royal assent, The Daily 
Mail reported that:  
 
[f]amily values were under attack again last night with the news that single women having IVF will be able 
to name anyone they like as their baby’s father on the birth certificate.  New regulations mean that a mother 
could nominate another woman to be her child’s ‘father’.  The ‘father’ does not need to be genetically 
related to the baby, nor in any sort of romantic relationship with the mother.
153
 
 
A string of reports in other newspapers shows that the Mail was not alone in viewing as ‘news’, 
provisions which had passed into law many months ago, a clear illustration of the lack of 
scrutiny of the status provisions during the reform process and consequent widespread lack of 
awareness of their content.
154
  Having discovered the provisions, the paper was able to produce a 
number of prominent critics to attack them as ‘social engineering on the hoof’,155 which ignored 
the ‘basic nature of a man and a woman bringing a child up together as parents’156 and leading to 
the ‘falsification of birth certificates’.157   These hostile comments mirror the criticisms which 
were voiced during the limited discussion of the status provisions during the reform process 
described above, which saw them described as ‘a radical and dangerous new departure in family 
law’,158 offering a ‘lego-kit model of family life’159 and equating children to ‘commodities such 
as washing machines’.160  Bewailing the new ‘agreed fatherhood conditions’, Lord Patten was 
driven to complain that:  
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The Government are able to define the meaning of ‘mother’ … Yet flip over [the] page and off we go into a 
magical mystery tour about what on earth the word ‘father’ might mean in different times and places, as a 
sign. This leads me to the conclusion that the Government, either by design or, as I suspect, by a muddled 
series of accidents, have ended up attempting to deconstruct the meaning of fatherhood in the Bill, 
divorcing male parenthood from biological reality as well as from practical and moral responsibilities.
161
 
 
In this paper, we have provided a detailed analysis of what is innovative about the revisions 
made to the status provisions.  The above critics are right in noting that, for the first time, two 
women can be named as a child’s parents from the moment of birth though they neglect to 
mention that, since December 2005, same-sex partners have been able both to be registered as a 
child’s adoptive parents.162  Critics are also correct to highlight that potential parents may not 
even be in a sexual relationship, yet they might also recall that neither was this a statutory 
requirement under the 1990 Act, which for unmarried couples required merely that a man receive 
‘treatment together’ with a woman.163  And, while Lord Patten may be offended by the 
contractual form of the provisions which have replaced the old ‘treatment together’ clause, to 
imply that there is anything new in divorcing male parenthood from ‘biological reality’ is clearly 
mistaken. As we noted above, such a separation was already clear in the 1990 Act and, indeed, in 
the Family Law Reform Act 1987 which preceded it.  Indeed, there is a strong argument to be 
made that the pater est principle has long prioritised the marital connection over the biological 
one.
164
  Lord Patten’s plea to remember the importance of ‘biological reality’ should also remind 
us of the contingency of what has been meant by the biological ‘truth’ in the context of 
motherhood.   For women, the biological link has both gestational and genetic components yet, 
for as long as it has been possible to separate these out, law has privileged the former over the 
latter.     
 
In this light, it is interesting to note one final issue which preoccupied actors in the reform 
process: the perceived deception implicit in naming on a birth certificate someone other than a 
child’s biological parents.165  In her critique of the (then draft) parenthood provisions, Thérèse 
Callus has written:   
 
By recognising the status of two female parents, the child’s identity is thrown into disarray because the 
recognition of two female parents conceals the necessary heterosexual element of human existence.  
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Admittedly, even the provisions [of the 1990 Act] on the use of donor gametes can lead to deception 
insofar as the parents may conceal their use of donated gametes, but the proposals double that deception.
166
    
 
This mirrors Baroness Deech’s plea to the House of Lords ‘for the truth to be on birth certificates 
– or at least no obvious lie’.167  Yet these interventions beg an interesting question: is the 
purported evil of deception lessened or increased in correlation with the likelihood of its 
discovery?  There is a strong counter-argument to be made to Callus that a child cannot long be 
successfully deceived where there are two named female parents on the birth certificate and, 
thus, if we are really concerned about lying to children, we should be far more worried about 
permitting a man other than the genetic father to be so named.
168
  Those accounts which argue 
that birth certificates should be a record of ‘true biological fact’ also need to grapple with a 
further problem: in some instances, this would require us to name more than two parents.   
 
This paper has attempted to tease out and render explicit the assumptions underpinning Part 2 of 
the 2008 Act.  Our aim has not been to criticise the law for its lack of internal coherence:  we 
make no assumption as to whether such coherence is achievable or, indeed, desirable.  The 
tensions and contradictions reflected in the above discussion are just as readily apparent in the 
way that ordinary people talk about parenting, as is well illustrated in recent interviews 
conducted with men regarding their visions of fatherhood and lesbian women regarding 
motherhood.
169
   The above analysis does, however, lead us to question the role played by the 
ideal of the ‘sexual family’ in limiting the options considered in this reform process and whether 
– and for how long – it can be maintained in the face of the pressures upon it which we have 
sketched above.   
 
Neither have we attempted any sustained normative analysis of the assumptions that we have 
highlighted as significant in underpinning the 2008 Act.  However, while we have provided no 
argument to say that they are misplaced, we would go so far as to suggest that they would have 
benefited from less reliance on intuition and more sustained analysis so that the assumptions 
behind our legislation are made subject to critical scrutiny, transparent debate and explicit 
choice.  As was seen above, while the status provisions reflect a series of commitments about the 
appropriate shape of the family, they were subject to very little attention from Parliament, the 
public or the media.  The complexity of these provisions may have encouraged a view that they 
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were largely ‘technical’ in nature, however other ‘technical’ aspects of the legislation (such as 
the provisions regulating use of human admixed embryos) attracted significant attention and we 
have aimed to demonstrate above that parenthood provisions raise no less interesting normative 
questions. This lack of scrutiny may well have contributed to a failure to identify and attempt to 
remedy problems for the future.  For example, we have noted the failure to tease out some of the 
complexities relating to transgender parenting and have suggested that the way in which the 
recognition of lesbian parents has been framed, closely paralleling the treatment of heterosexual 
parents, is not necessarily well designed to fit the specificities of same sex families.  Specifically, 
we described the lack of rights accorded to a woman who contributes an egg to create a child 
with her partner, who will be the gestational (and therefore legal) mother.  More generally, it is 
likely that English law will be forced to address the question of whether to recognise more than 
two legal parents at some point in the future.  As we noted above, however, the Department of 
Health was quite clear in its view that it was not the right body to oversee any wide ranging 
changes to family law: if such sustained analysis of the law regulating parenthood is to occur, it 
must happen elsewhere.
170
  While this reluctance is understandable, the lack of such analysis 
meant that earlier provisions which have become increasingly out of step with other aspects of 
family law over time were left intact and that new measures were developed at least in part in 
reliance on common sense assumptions rather than detailed analysis and sustained consideration. 
 
It has been argued elsewhere that the vision of the family underpinning the 1990 Act was already 
an anachronism at the time that it was passed.
171
  The gulf between the sexual family ideal and 
shifting patterns of parenting were readily apparent to the judiciary in 1990, with contemporary 
judges routinely making complex determinations designed to protect children’s relationships 
with a range of adults, rather than seeking mechanically to impose the template of the nuclear 
family model onto social realities which did not obviously fit easily within it.  The inherent 
traditionalism of the 1990 Act was at least in part explicable through anxieties regarding the 
possibilities offered by reproductive technologies, resulting in a ‘conservative impulse’ to 
contain them.
172
  Some of the reforms effected by the 2008 Act might therefore seem to reflect a 
coming of age of reproductive technologies and a more relaxed attitude to their regulation.
173
  On 
the other hand, we have here tracked the extent to which the more radical possibilities offered by 
assisted reproductive technologies were shelved or left unconsidered.  We suggested that while 
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the two-parent model has outlived its moorings in the heterosexual couple, that this model has 
continued to frame understandings of parenthood and lies at the root of some interesting tensions 
in this reform process, underpinning the refusals to admit the possibility that a child can have 
two ‘fathers’ or two ‘mothers’, that a child can have three legal parents or that motherhood can 
be grounded in anything other than gestation.  And, indeed, the very fact that reproductive 
technologies remain regulated by primary legislation, only to be offered under licence, may 
signal an ongoing suspicion both of the technologies and of those who seek to use them.
174
  
 
In practice, only a tiny minority of individuals will ever gain parenthood by virtue of the legal 
principles which form the focus of this paper.
175
  Yet we would suggest that these provisions are 
nonetheless of very significant interest.  In this reform process, while the reformers tended to 
rely on a combination of common sense intuitions regarding who should count as family and a 
general desire to achieve ‘equality’, we can nonetheless trace a complex and ongoing 
renegotiation of the boundaries of law’s understanding of family, with the end result being to 
encompass a broader range of familial arrangements and, most notably, to further recognition of 
families headed by a lesbian couple.  How the more radical potential of the 2008 Act to open up 
parenthood more visibly to non-partners under the agreed fatherhood and female parenthood 
provisions will reconfigure our understandings of family remains to be seen, with much 
depending on how clinics understand the provisions and their willingness to accept that non-
partners are eligible for treatment.
176
  It would seem that relocating the boundaries of family will 
inevitably result in a new series of exclusions,
177
 which will provoke their own controversies in 
years to come, inevitably again falling to be renegotiated as our ideas of family shift further.  As 
Phil Willis MP, the Chair of the Joint Committee put it: 
 
Since 1990, we have had a recognition of non-nuclear families, the like of which I wouldn’t have believed 
possible.  You know ... like many of the creatures over here [in the House of Commons] ... [I was] brought 
up in the generations that recognise the nuclear family as the norm and everything else as abnormal or 
slightly abnormal.  And yet, legislation, you know, has really changed all those definitions.  And the idea 
that families in the future will not again morph in different directions... I think it’s fanciful to think that that 
is not going to happen, because I think it is.  I think you mentioned about more than two parents – I think 
that may well become the reality.  You know, you have a number of people who actually are the family of 
an individual child or children.  Now, what do you do about that?
178
 
                                                 
174
 As Webb informed us, whether procedures such as IVF should be legally registered was one of the first things to 
be considered by the Department of Health in this process, the conclusion being that ‘there was still need for it.’  
Interview on file. 
 
175
 Indeed, as we noted above, only a small minority of those who make use of assisted conception are caught by 
these provisions.  
 
176
 We thank Emily Jackson for this important point.  As we noted above, the steer provided to clinicians in the 
HFEA’s Code of Practice is potentially misleading, in implying that all second parents will be partners.  Above, n 
67. 
 
177
 As Callus puts it, in her critique of the new provisions, ‘Justified on the premise of equality, the proposals in fact 
give rise to further inequalities’ (n 160 above at 146). 
 
178
 Willis, interview on file. 
